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Summary
Disputes have arisen recently over whether or not to declassify portions of the
sensitive content of reports resulting from congressional investigations and national
commission inquiries into the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the war in Iraq,
and related matters.  As a result, some have called for Congress to create a special
mechanism for the impartial and expeditious resolution of such disputes (S. 2672/H.R.
4855), which may also facilitate better information sharing as recommended by the 9/11
Commission.  In this regard, Congress has previously legislated special arrangements
for the impartial and expeditious review of certain kinds of officially secret records with
a view to making them available to the public.  Such efforts at balancing legitimate
competing needs for secrecy and openness are examined in this report, which will be
updated as events warrant.
Controversy has developed of late over what some regard to be zealous use of
security classification to make segments of investigative reports officially secret.  J.
William Leonard, director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), which
is responsible for executive branch oversight of security classification, has taken issue
with the classification of portions of the report of Major General Antonio M. Taguba
concerning his investigation of prisoner interrogation conditions at Abu Ghraib Prison,
and called the action a “bureaucratic impulse” to “almost reflexively reach out to the
classification system.”1
Recent problems with security-classifiable information in congressional documents
date from the closing months of 2002, when the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence prepared to publish their
report on their joint inquiry into intelligence community activities prior to, and after, the
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September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.2  “It took more than six months of wrangling,”
according to a Washington Post editorial, “for the congressional joint committee
investigating the Sept. 11 attacks to extract approval to publish its report — and even then
it had to black out an entire section involving Saudi Arabia.”3  A similar experience
occurred with the July 9, 2004, release of the Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on
the intelligence community’s prewar intelligence assessments on Iraq.4  According to one
account, an estimated 20% of the draft report was deleted at the request of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) prior to its publication.5  “It could have been worse, though,”
editorialized the Washington Post: “If Intelligence officials had their way, nearly half of
the 511-page report would have been redacted, rather than the 15 percent or so that was
excised in the final version.”6
These developments have prompted calls for the creation of an independent panel
for the impartial and expeditious resolution of disputes over whether or not to declassify
portions of the sensitive content of official reports prior to their publication.  In its recent
editorial on the matter, the Washington Post said:
No one wants to insist on the release of information that could aid terrorists or other
enemies of the United States.  Clearly, some information reviewed by lawmakers or
other investigators must remain secret.  But the way the system is structured, no one
can have confidence that the judgments to keep information classified are being made
on the basis of national security alone — and there is ample evidence to the contrary.
The reports already produced have offered a powerful, even chastening demonstration
of the importance of outside oversight and review; it’s hard to see what the arguments
for classifying parts of those documents would have been.  Among other effects, this
undermines the credibility of the classifiers when it comes to protecting real secrets.7
The creation of such a panel may facilitate improved information sharing, and
“restore a better balance between security and shared knowledge,” as recommended
recently by the 9/11 Commission.8 
Concerning the impact of extensive use of classification on the integrity of the
classification system, the late Potter Stewart, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
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warned that “when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by
those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.”  Indeed, he continued, “the hallmark
of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure,
recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly maintained.”9
Security Classification
Since 1940, security classification policy and procedure — the creation of official
secrets — has been prescribed in a series of presidential executive orders.  Current
arrangements are mandated by E.O. 12958, as amended by E.O. 13292.10  Congress has,
on occasion, considered statutorily establishing security classification policy, but has not
actively pursued the matter.11  The presidential orders specify three levels of protection,
ranging from “Confidential,” to “Secret,” to “Top Secret,” the last being the highest.
They also indicate types of information that may be so protected, such as “military plans”
and “intelligence activities”; the duration of such protection; and the manner in which
classified information is to be identified and marked.  Classification prohibitions and
limitations are provided.  For instance, information is not to be classified to conceal
violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error.  Procedures for conducting
background investigations and granting security clearances for individuals to have access
to classified information are also specified in presidential directives, as are the senior
executive branch officials who are vested with authority to classify an original document.
Other federal personnel classify documents on a derivative basis; that is, they classify
records on the basis of their content having been derived from other classified material.
Security classification may be used as an auxiliary to other national security
information protection requirements.  For example, since 1947, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) has been statutorily required to “protect intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.”12  This may be accomplished, in part, through
security classification and attendant procedures, but is a responsibility that the DCI must
fulfill apart from the use of security classification.
Security-classified documents may become declassified if a date or event for
declassification, prescribed at the time of their classification, is realized; an applicable
time frame, such as 10 years or, by extension, 25 years, from the date of original
classification, lapses; an authorized holder of the classified documents successfully
challenges the continued need for their protected status; or a mandatory review by agency
officials, prompted by a request pursuant to the President’s security classification
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executive order or the access procedures of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, results
in a determination that classification is no longer warranted.
Accelerated Declassification
Beginning in 1992, Congress has legislated special arrangements for the impartial
and expeditious review of certain kinds of officially secret records, with a view to making
them available to the public.  The first of these involved records pertaining to the
November 22, 1963, assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas, TX.  Efforts
by the public to gain access to records deriving from federal investigations and
examinations of the assassination of President Kennedy and surrounding events were
frustrated by several complications.  Operative since July 1967, the FOI Act provides any
person — individual or corporate, regardless of citizenship — with access to identifiable,
unpublished, existing records of the federal departments and agencies without having to
demonstrate a need or even a reason for such a request.13  The burden of proof for
withholding material sought by the public is placed upon the government.  The statute,
however, specifies nine categories of information that may be withheld from disclosure.
Among these stated exemptions to the rule of disclosure are protections for (1)
information properly classified for national defense or foreign policy purposes as secret
under criteria established by an executive order; (2) data specifically excepted from
disclosure by a statute which requires that matters be withheld in a non-discretionary
manner or which establishes particular criteria for withholding, or refers to particular
types of matters to be withheld; (3) personnel, medical, and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and (4) certain kinds
of investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes.14  These four exemptions
tended to be the ones most often invoked by the agencies in support of their withholding
of assassination materials sought pursuant to the FOI Act.  In addition, congressional
records were not subject to the FOI Act, nor were state or local government records, and
law enforcement records of these jurisdictions were exemptible under comparable state
FOI laws.
JFK, a 1991 film dramatization of President Kennedy’s assassination and
surrounding circumstances, heightened public interest in the tragedy and explanations of
its occurrence.  Subsequently, former President Gerald Ford, the only surviving member
of the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, chaired by
Chief Justice Earl Warren, publicly appealed to the leaders of the House of
Representatives to seek release of all records concerning the assassination.15  Furthermore,
various conspiracy theories, contentions, and unsubstantiated stories about the event and
those allegedly involved in its perpetration, which had arisen during the subsequent
decades, were troubling to many Americans.  In response, Congress legislated procedures
and conditions for the independent review and expeditious disclosure of previously
unreleased official records relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy.  The
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vehicle for these arrangements was the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992.16
The statute created a temporary, independent, five-member board to manage the
gathering of relevant records for inclusion in the Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection, and to review the included records with a view to their immediate or later
public disclosure in whole or in part.  Appointed by the President from private life with
the advice and consent of the Senate, board members received the security clearances
necessary for them to perform their duties.  Among the records examined by the board
members were approximately 250,000 to 300,000 pages of relevant CIA material, and
another 23 linear feet of records, 2,500 pages of which related to the portion of the
investigation conducted by the Commission to Investigate CIA Activities Within the
United States concerning the Kennedy assassination.17  The review board completed its
work and expired in the closing months of 1998.18  The resulting President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection is managed by the National Archives and
Records Administration.19  The review board received a total appropriation of $3,750,000
for its operations.20  In December 2003, National Archives management generally
estimated that 98%-99% of the collection is open in part for public examination, and
indicated that national security is the principal reason why some materials remained
undisclosed at that time.
As the Kennedy assassination records review board was completing its work,
Congress enacted the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act, which created an interagency
group to “locate, identify, inventory, recommend for declassification, and make available
to the public at the National Archives and Records Administration, all classified Nazi war
criminal records held by the United States,” among other functions.21  The President was
given broad discretion to appoint to the interagency group such government officials as
he deemed appropriate, including, specifically, the director of the Holocaust Museum, the
historian of the Department of State, the Archivist of the United States, and at least three
members from private life.  Two years later, this mandate was supplemented by adding
classified Japanese Imperial Government records held by the United States to the efforts
of the interagency group to organize, recommend for declassification, and make available
to the public certain sensitive captured records of the World War II era.22  The National
Archives provides ongoing information concerning the activities and operations of the
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interagency group on its website, including copies of Disclosure, the newsletter of the
group, and related research papers.23
New Arrangements
In its editorial proposing consideration of “an alternative mechanism that could
balance the legitimate competing needs for secrecy and openness” when disputes arise
over whether or not to declassify portions of the sensitive content of an official report
prior to its publication, the Washington Post suggested “a souped-up version of an
existing entity, the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel [ISCAP], created
in 1995 to rule on declassification requests and composed of representatives from the
CIA, the State, Defense, and Justice departments, the national security adviser, and the
National Archives.”24  ISCAP was established by E.O. 12958; the director of ISOO serves
as the executive secretary of ISCAP.  According to its most recent activities report,
ISCAP acted upon 37 appeals involving 101 documents in 2002, and “voted to declassify
11 documents (11%) in full, to declassify portions of 56 others (55%), and to affirm the
agencies’ decisions in their entirety for 34 documents (34%).”25
In furtherance of revising classification arrangements, Senator Ron Wyden, with
Senators Trent Lott, Robert Graham, and Olympia Snowe as cosponsors, introduced S.
2672, the Independent National Security Classification Board Act, on July 15, 2004.  The
legislation would establish within the executive branch a board of three members,
appointed by the President with Senate approval, “to review and make recommendations
on overhauling the standards and processes used in the classification system for national
security information,” according to Senator Wyden.  The new standards and processes
proposed by the board would be offered for congressional and executive comment and
revision.  Thereafter, the board would “begin to implement the new system, reviewing and
making recommendations on current and new national security classifications, subject to
Executive Branch veto that must be accompanied by a public, written explanation.”
Referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence, the bill seeks to improve security
classification arrangements generally, and, through requested reviews of classification
decisions, address the disputes over declassifying portions of the sensitive content of an
official report prior to its publication. “The balance in this proposal,” said Senator Wyden,
“assures that the public and Congress have access to an independent Board for national
security classification matters while leaving undisturbed the Commander in Chief’s
constitutional prerogative in military and foreign policy matters through the power to
appoint the Board and to veto the Board’s classification decisions.”26  A companion bill,
H.R. 4855, was introduced in the House on July 19 by Representative Robert Cramer, Jr.,
and it was referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
